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THIS DOG HAS TEETH... COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
"Federalism is boring," or so certain law students say.' The fed-
eral regulatory state has been growing largely unchecked for the
past thirty years, leaving a strong national authority and a relatively
weak state program in terms of environmental programs.2 Federal-
ism, however, is still an important factor in deciding many current
environmental issues.3
The Clean Air Act (CAA) is described as an "experiment in
federalism" because it gives the states a role in regulating air pollu-
tion.4 In fact, what many consider to be federal environmental poli-
cies, are in reality state environmental policies.5 However, in the
past decade, the United States Supreme Court has slowly been over-
turning federal statutes on the grounds that the power conferred in
them is best left to the states. 6 This indicated that the Court revived
the federalism doctrine, which could be problematic for the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) and its quest for full state im-
plementation of the CAA. 7
In January 2004, the Court decided Alaska Department of Envi-
ronmental Conservation v. Environmental Protection Agency (Red Dog)8
following a number of other major federalism cases. 9 In those
1. SeeJohn P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L.
REv. 1183, 1184 (1995) (discussing how federalism relates to environmental law
after thirty years of federal regulatory growth).
2. See id. at 1184-85 (noting various federal environmental acts that have been
passed over past thirty years, and their effects on state programs).
3. See id. at 1185 (discussing fights between EPA and states over implementa-
tion of current environmental laws).
4. See Michigan v. EPA, 268 F.3d 1075, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (discussing ori-
gins of Clean Air Act and what its intentions were).
5. See Jonathan H. Adler, The Green Aspects of Printz: The Revival of Federalism
and its Implications for Environmental Law, 6 GEo. MASON L. REv. 573, 575 (1998)
(discussing how state environmental policies are mistaken for federal law).
6. See Adler, supra note 5, at 573 (1998) (noting Supreme Court rulings that
overturned federal laws on federalism grounds).
7. See John P. Halfpenny, Alaska and the Red Dog Mine Bite Back After the EPA
Tightens the Leash, LEGAL INrELL., (April 7, 2003) (stating Alaska's intention to ap-
peal EPA decision on pollution control technology required in Alaskan mine).
8. See Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. EPA, 124 S. Ct.
983 (2004) [hereinafter Red Dog].
9. See Charles Lane, Justices Decide EPA Can Overrule States; Bar to Zinc Mine
Expansion is Upheld, WASH. POST, January 22, 2004 at A12 (discussing how Court
(109)
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cases, a majority of the Court recognized that the Constitution cre-
ated a limited federal government, and reserved most rights to the
states. In Red Dog, the Court upheld a law similar to those it previ-
ously overturned. 10
The erratic nature of the Supreme Court in recent federalism
jurisprudence is having a profound impact on environmental law."
Most federal environmental laws rely in some degree upon the
states for their implementation, but the states are not always willing
to cooperate. 12 Many federal statutes contain inducements for the
states to follow federal law, allowing the federal government to set
policy for the states.13 Therefore, any constitutional jurisprudence
restricting the ability of Congress to set such policy limits would
inevitably upset the delicate balance between the federal and state
governments with respect to environmental policy. 14
This Comment reviews Red Dog in the context of the Supreme
Court's recent federalism jurisprudence and assesses its impact on
environmental law. 15 Section II provides a brief historical overview
of the federal-state relationship in the environmental context and
the Supreme Court's recent federalism decisions.16 Section III ap-
plies Red Dog to earlier circuit court cases and discusses its impact
on cooperative federalism.1 7 Lastly, Section IV suggests that the na-
tion's interests would be better served with a federal environmental
plan that works in conjunction with the states. 18
veered away from its previous rulings concerning federalism). Lane notes the rul-
ing "significantly reinforced federal supremacy in pollution-control matters.
See id.
10. See id. (noting dissent's argument that this case disagreed with previous
Supreme Court federalism jurisprudence).
11. See Adler, supra note 5, at 574 (discussing possible positive environmental
effects of Supreme Court decision in U.S. v. Printz).
12. See id. at 573 (discussing possible positive environmental effects of Su-
preme Court decision in U.S. v. Printz).
13. See id. at 575 (noting that states are often reluctant to follow federal law
without inducements).
14. See id. (discussing delicate balance between federal and state governments
and how it has ability to fall apart if law regarding it is ruled unconstitutional).
15. For a discussion on cooperative federalism and Supreme Court jurispru-
dence, see infra notes 19-95 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of Red Dog, see infra notes 96-117 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of Red Dog's application to current environmental policy,
see infra notes 120-69 and accompanying text.
18. For an analysis of cooperative federalism, see infra notes 157-69 and ac-
companying text.
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COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
II. BACKGROUND
A. Federalism
Federal funding of environmental research and state level pol-
lution control efforts began largely in the late 1940s.19 Originally,
federal environmental regulations generally dealt with issues such
as keeping waterways unobstructed. 20 Beginning in the early 1960s,
with the publication of the book, Silent Spring, environmental issues
began to take more precedence on the national level.2 ' This book,
coupled with a number of highly visible environmental disasters,
led to an explosion of federal environmental regulations beginning
in the early 1970s, including the CAA in 1970.22 These laws estab-
lished national standards, but also strongly encouraged and some-
times coerced state cooperation. 23
While the early laws were successfully implemented, concerns
arose about the ability of a nationalized regulatory system to ad-
dress local environmental problems.2 4 For example, in 1995 the
National Academy of Public Administration concluded, "EPA and
Congress need to hand more responsibility and decision making
authority over to the states."25 Many feel that federal environmen-
tal regulation is "bloated and overly bureaucratic," and needs im-
provement.2 6 It is in this framework, as "national environmental
policy has surged to the forefront of contemporary federalism de-
bates," that recent Supreme Court decisions concerning regulatory
federalism have had an impact on environmental law.2 7
19. See Adler, supra note 5, at 576 (discussing history of state and federal envi-
ronmental statutes and their funding).
20. See id. (discussing general purpose of most environmental standards dur-
ing this period).
21. See ALAN BRINKLEY, THE UNFINISHED NATION: A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE, 909 (Wes Knopf ed., McGraw Hill Publishers 1993) (noting how
Silent Spring brought up concerns about effect of pesticides on environment).
22. See id. 909-10 (discussing oil spill off coast of California in 1969, finding of
toxic waste at Love Canal in 1978 and near meltdown at Three Mile Island in
1979).
23. See Adler, supra note 5, at 576-78 (discussing enforcement of federal laws
at state level).
24. See Dwyer, supra note 1, at 1195-96 (stating that local entities reserve sub-
stantial power under various environmental regulations).
25. See Adler, supra note 5, at 577 (citations omitted) (discussing ways EPA
can become more efficient).
26. See id. (noting that Congress and EPA's environmental plans resemble
"Soviet-style planning").
27. See id. at 577 (citations omitted) (noting recent Supreme Court rulings
have had effect on environmental law).
2005]
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1. Cooperative Federalism
Federal laws that do not directly give oversight agencies the
authority to regulate state programs generally follow a model of
"cooperative federalism."28 The EPA must approve state attempts
to implement federal environmental statutes. 29 If a state does not
cooperate with the EPA it can be subject to penalties, such as losing
federal funds.30 Each state has the flexibility to create environmen-
tal programs that suit its needs, but the programs must be within
federal law if they want to receive federal funds.3 1 Some commen-
tators have noted that cooperative federalism is a "partnership be-
tween the state and federal governments, albeit an unequal one." 32
Without cooperative federalism, states would risk a complete
nationalization of their environmental programs.33 Various statutes
employ cooperative federalism, such as the CAA, the Clean Water
Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act.3 4
There are generally three reasons given for using cooperative
federalism. 35 First, if the federal government managed environ-
mental policy it would be cost prohibitive and greatly inefficient. 36
Since the inception of these programs in the late 1960s and early
1970s, numerous analysts have noted that without state coopera-
tion, a centralized federal environmental program is doomed to
fail. 37 This is because of the vastly different landscapes around the
28. See id. at 578-79 (explaining cooperative federalism model).
29. See Red Dog, 124 S. Ct. at 983, 991 (discussing system EPA has where it can
overrule state regulatory agency decisions).
30. See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contem-
porary Models, 54 MD. L. REv. 1141, 1166 (1995) (citations omitted) (discussing that
using its spending power Congress can attach conditions on states' receipt of fed-
eral funds). Congress may do this if the conditions "bear some relationship to the
purpose of federal spending". See id. at 166.
31. See Adler, supra note 5, at 578 (discussing state plans to implement envi-
ronmental policy and how they are subject to federal approval).
32. See id. (discussing state/federal government relationship in context of en-
vironmental federalism).
33. See id. (citing to 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1385 (2004)) (discussing risks of not
allowing cooperative federalism).
34. See id. (discussing various federal acts that employ cooperative feder-
alism).
35. See id. (discussing three reasons for cooperative federalism).
36. See Adler, supra note 5, at 579 (noting problems if federal government
completely controlled environmental policy without state support).
37. See id. (quoting Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federal-
ism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J.
1196 (1977)) (noting problems associated with trying to implement national envi-
ronmental policy).
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country and the inordinate cost associated with an exclusively na-
tional program.38
Second, environmental issues vary in each state.3 9 As former
Representative Thomas "Tip" O'Neil (D-MA) once famously said,
"[a]ll politics are local," and the same seemingly goes for the envi-
ronment.40 Additionally, John Dwyer noted "the knowledge neces-
sary to administer any air pollution control program.., can only be
found at the local level." 41 Each state's environment is different, so
environmental policies are necessarily going to be different in Los
Angeles than they are in Bismarck.42
The third issue is local politics because environmental pro-
grams can rarely be implemented without inconveniencing some-
one, so they invariably cause strife. 43  Without local political
support, implementing environmental policy can be extremely dif-
ficult, if not impossible. 44 If local support is gained, however, it will
be easier to implement federal environmental programs, and if
problems arise local politicians can always blame the "great federal
bureaucracy.'45
While cooperative federalism is not perfect, it is considered the
best available method.4 6 Other alternative methods, such as federal
preemption or federal coercion, are more controversial and consti-
tutionally suspect. 47 On the other hand, cooperative federalism has
already been approved by the Court.48
38. See id. (discussing problems associated with federal government mandat-
ing state functions in environmental context).
39. See id. (discussing how environmental issues vary given divergent political
and economic landscapes of each state).
40. See RicHARD B. CHENEY, KINGS OF THE HILL 204 (Sarah Baker ed., Simon
and Schuster 1996) (discussing comment made by Rep. O'Neil).
41. See Adler, supra note 5, at 579 (citing Dwyer, 54 MD. L. REv. at 1218) (not-
ing how solutions to environmental problems are found at state level).
42. See id. (noting how pollution levels vary between U.S. regions).
43. See id. (discussing how environmental regulations invariably effect land
use, lifestyles and economic situation).
44. See id. (noting effect from lack of local political support).
45. See Adler, supra note 5 at 579-80 (discussing what happens when local co-
operation for environmental policy is gained).
46. See id. (discussing cooperative federalism).
47. See id. (discussing alternatives to cooperative federalism and how they may
or may not actually be successful).
48. See id. (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S.
264, 289). This case discusses the Supreme Court's endorsement of cooperative
federalism. See id.
2005]
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2. Problems of Cooperative Federalism
State and local governments have fiercely resisted federally im-
posed environmental programs, despite the federal government's
efforts to try and maintain a closer federal-state relationship. 49 En-
vironmental standards have caused hostility between the federal
and state governments, especially due to unfunded mandates.5 0
State and local governments must comply with unfunded man-
dates.5 1 However, the states often do not receive federal funding to
implement the mandates, thereby forcing state funds to be spent
on federal programs.5 2
In 1994, Governing Magazine noted that there were nearly
"four hundred separate subsections of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions involving environmental matters which applied to local gov-
ernments, and many were unfunded mandates. ' 53 Congress
attempted to deal with the problem with the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995. 54 This law, however, has proven to be "more
symbolic than substantive. '55 It set up procedures for creating new
mandates while doing "nothing to limit or reduce those mandates
already in existence. '5 6
Another problem of cooperative federalism is that the federal
government thinks in "black and white terms. '57 This means the
government is seen as too rigid, often insisting that a rule be fol-
lowed a certain way, whether it is sensible for a state to do so or
not.58  One commentator noted, "[m]any states resented the
49. See id. (noting limits of state-federal cooperation).
50. See Adler, supra note 5, at 580-82 (discussing problems of unfunded
mandates).
51. See id. at 580 (noting that unfunded mandates have long been problem
between state and federal governments).
52. See id. (discussing how states often lack funds to comply with federal
mandates).
53. See id. (citations omitted) (noting that state officials often have wary rela-
tionship with EPA).
54. See id. at 581 (citing Rena I. Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental Mandates
and the "New (New) Federalism" Devolution, Revolution, or Reform?, 81 MINN. L. REv.
97, 99-100 (1996) (noting that unfunded mandate reform may not have antici-
pated effect of lowering number of unfunded mandates now required by
Congress).
55. See Adler, supra note 5, at 581 (citations omitted). Here Adler discusses
the value of unfunded mandates and the need to streamline the process. See id.
56. See id. (discussing unfunded mandates).
57. See id. at 582 (noting rigidity of federal government in interpreting laws).
58. See id. (discussing state official and American public's views of federal
control).
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[EPA] 's attempt to subject them to a uniform policy regarding civil
penalties and some flatly refused to abide by its terms."5 9
B. Federalism and the Supreme Court
1. Background
While the political pressure has grown to give states more au-
tonomy over environmental matters, the Supreme Court has only
recently reopened the long dormant idea of federalism.60 Begin-
ning in 1976 with National League of Cities v. Usery (Usery),61 the
Court invalidated a Congressional attempt forcing state and local
governments to comply with the wage provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.62 In his majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist noted
that the Supreme Court has never doubted "that there are limits
upon the power of Congress to override state sovereignty," and this
case was an example of those limits. 6 3 The Supreme Court set up a
test to determine whether a state was immune to federal regula-
tion.64 The test created was whether the governmental function in
question was an integral or traditional state function.65 If the func-
tion was integral or traditional, then the state function was immune
from the reach of federal law.6 6 Following Usery, numerous other
attempts to challenge federal laws on the grounds they infringed
upon state sovereignty failed. 67
59. See David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a
"Reinvented" State/Federal Relationship. The Divide Between Theory and Reality, 24 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, fn. 218 (2000) (citations omitted) (discussing state views on deal-
ing with federal mandates).
60. See Adler, supra note 5, at 582 (discussing recent resurgence in federalism
related cases before Supreme Court).
61. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) [hereinafter
Useiy] (noting Congress' power under Commerce Clause could be invalidated if it
interfered with state sovereignty).
62. See id. at 855 (stating Congress may not use Commerce Clause to force
states into choices about how they run their own governments).
63. See id. at 842 (discussing history of Tenth Amendment and Supreme
Court's interpretation of it).
64. See id. at 852 (discussing Supreme Court's test to determine whether state
was immune from reaches of federal law).
65. See id. (discussing Court's test).
66. See Usery, 426 U.S. at 852-53 (noting results of Supreme Court's test).
67. See Adler, supra note 5, at 584 (discussing various cases where states at-
tempted to argue that federal law was intruding on traditional state matters, but
Supreme Court rebuffed them).
2005]
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In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (Garcia) ,68
the Supreme Court reversed the Usery ruling. 69 The Supreme
Court held it was a legislative function to determine areas of state
sovereignty, rather than a judicial function. 70 The dissent claimed
that this decision would cripple the Tenth Amendment, and effec-
tively leave Congress unchecked when it came to using the Com-
merce Clause power.71 In 1988, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
Garcia in South Carolina v. Baker72
2. Revival of Federalism
Beginning in the early 1990s the Supreme Court revived the
federalism doctrine. 73 In New York v. United States (New York),74 the
Supreme Court invalidated various provisions of the Low-Level Ra-
dioactive Waste Policy Act, which required states to either accept
ownership of waste created within their own borders or regulate it
according to federal law. 75 The Court held these provisions in-
fringed on state sovereignty because the federal government was
usurping a traditional state function. 76 This decision proscribed
the methods that Congress may use to set national policy goals for
the states.77 However, it also allowed for "cooperative federalism,"
because Congress could give states a choice between administering
a program in accordance with federal standards or allowing for fed-
eral preemption of state programs. 78
68. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528
(1985) [hereinafter Garcia] (holding that city transit authority was not immune
from Act's minimum wage and overtime requirements).
69. See id. at 531 (stating that Usery ruling has been unworkable in practice).
70. See Adler, supra note 5, at 585 (citing Garcia, 469 U.S. at 560) (noting that
Congress is proper body to determine this issue, rather than judiciary).
71. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 560 (Powell,J. dissenting) (stating that majority was
giving Congress too much power regarding Commerce Clause).
72. See generally South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988) (reaffirming
Garcia holding).
73. See Percival, supra note 28, at 1165-66 (discussing hostility of Congress and
Supreme Court to federal regulation and Court's changing view of state
sovereignty).
74. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) [hereinafter New York]
(discussing how Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act's "take-title" provision, re-
quiring states to accept ownership of waste or regulate according to federal regula-
tions was invalid in face of Tenth Amendment).
75. See id. at 145 (stating that Congress cannot coerce states into taking own-
ership of waste within state borders).
76. See id. at 145-47 (noting reasons why "take-title" provision of law fails).
77. See Adler, supra note 5, at 587 (discussing effect of New York decision).
78. See id. (citations omitted) (discussing possible Congressional programs
that would pass Constitutional muster).
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The Supreme Court's new found support of federalism flour-
ished throughout the 1990s. Following New York, the Court in 1995
decided United States v. Lopez (Lopez).79 In Lopez, the Court invali-
dated the Gun-Free School Zones Act as an illegal assertion of Con-
gress' Commerce Clause power.80 While this decision would
seemingly only affect Congress' Commerce Clause power, it also re-
inforced the idea of "dual sovereignty" between the state and fed-
eral governments. 81 In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy noted
that if the federal government was allowed to regulate non-eco-
nomic situations under the Commerce Clause then, "the bounda-
ries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur
and political responsibility would become illusory."8 2 This idea was
later reaffirmed when the Supreme Court struck down the Violence
Against Women Act in United States v. Morrison (Morrison).83 In Mor-
rison, the Court noted that interstate commerce power may not be
extended to embrace effects "so indirect and remote" that it would
effectively obliterate the distinction between national and local
authority.8 4
Following Lopez, the Court overturned portions of the Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act in Printz v. United States
(Printz).85 The Court noted that the Constitution established a sys-
tem of dual sovereignty where the states relinquished some rights,
but retained residuary and uninfringeable sovereignty. 86 Further,
the Court noted that while Congress had the power to prohibit
some acts, the Constitution does not authorize the federal govern-
ment to compel states to implement federal regulatory programs.8 7
79. See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) [hereinafter Lopez]
(stating that Gun-Free School Zones Act, which made it federal offense to bring a
firearm into a school zone exceeded Congress' Commerce Clause authority).
80. See id. at 549-50 (discussing how carrying gun into school zones had little
or anything to do with interstate commerce).
81. See Adler, supra note 5, at 588 (noting Lopez simply reinforces cooperative
federalism).
82. See id. at 589 (citations omitted) (noting Justice Kennedy's dissent).
83. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) [hereinafter Morrison]
(striking down Violence Against Women Act as invalid use of Congress' Commerce
Clause power).
84. See id. at 598 (saying that Commerce Clause power can only reach to
things that are directly effected by interstate commerce).
85. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) [hereinafter Printz] (strik-
ing down portions of Brady Bill requiring state agents to conduct background
checks on gun purchasers).
86. See id. at 899 (noting power of states with regards to some areas has not
been diminished and is protected).
87. See id. at 899-900 (noting Congress may not compel states to implement
federal programs).
20051
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Another issue in Printz was one of political accountability.88
Jonathan Adler noted that Printz undermined the structural bal-
ance between the federal and state governments that the Framers
sought to make.8 9 He noted that there should be two lines of politi-
cal accountability: one between citizens and the federal govern-
ment and another between citizens and their state governments. 90
Following Printz, there was concern that the Supreme Court
would strike down federal environmental laws requiring states to
follow certain federal regulations. 91 The federal law that appeared
to be in the most danger was the CAA.92 The Act itself sets air stan-
dards for state and local governments, as well as schedules for com-
pliance.93 Failure to reach standards can result in federal penalties,
including the loss of highway funds.94 The CAA does offer. the
states a cooperative model, where they can allow the federal govern-
ment to take over their programs, but such a takeover comes at a
tremendous cost to the states.95
III. THE RED DOG DECISION
A. Facts
The CAA's Prevention of Significant Deterioration Program
bars constructing any major air pollutant emitting facility not
equipped with the best available control technology (BACT).96
The BACT is "an emission limitation based on the maximum de-
gree of pollutant reduction ... which the [state] permitting author-
ity, on a case-by-case basis determines is achievable for the
authority. ' '97 The CAA generally authorizes the EPA, when it finds
88. See Adler, supra note 5, at 606 (noting that under Brady Act, Congress
passes most of burden of implementing federal program to states). The states
then are forced to take on a large financial burden, while Congress can say that it
has solved a problem. Id.
89. See id. (stating that political accountability was key in Printz decision).
90. See id. (discussing lines of political accountability).
91. See id. at 609 (noting how Printz decision could force major reorientations
of environmental policy, especially where federal government relies upon states to
follow federal law).
92. See id. at 617 (discussing contentious nature of CAA and how it sparked
fierce criticism).
.93. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2) (A) (2004) (stating requirements imposed on
states by CAA).
94. See id. § 7410(a) (2) (B) (2004) (stating consequences of failure to meet
statutory requirements).
95. See Adler, supra note 5, at 619 (noting costs that would be inflicted on
state if they were to allow for federal takeover under CAA).
96. See Red Dog, 124 S. Ct. 983, 985 (2004) (discussing CAA BACT program).
97. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7479(3) (2004) (providing definition of BACT).
10
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a state in noncompliance with the BACT requirement, to "take such
measures necessary" to prevent constructing a facility that does not
comply with the EPA's standards.98
In 1998, the Red Dog Mine applied to the Alaska Department
of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) to increase the amount of
nitrogen oxide, a regulated air pollutant, released from its genera-
tors.99 The mine proposed to use "Low NO." as the BACT for its
generators. 100 The "Low NO," procedure is a process of high com-
bustion air temperatures that better atomized toxic particles, reduc-
ing the amount of nitrogen oxide released. 101 The ADEC, however,
determined that Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR), a process
where exhaust is mixed with ammonia and combined with a catalyst
to reduce emissions would be the proper BACT for the mine.10 2 In
response, the mine amended its application, proposing to install
the less costly "Low NO," process on all its generators instead of
installing the SCR process on one generator. 10 3 The ADEC ap-
proved the mine's amended application in May 1999.104
The EPA determined that the ADEC's approval of the mine's
application was unacceptable because the CAA does not allow the
use of something less than the BACT, even if equivalent emissions
reductions are obtained by imposing new controls on other
units.10 5 In December 1999, the EPA issued a Finding of Non-Com-
pliance Order, stating that the ADEC plan for Red Dog Mine vio-
lated the CAA.106 The ADEC responded by granting the mine's
permit and the EPA issued orders preventing the mine from con-
structing and installing the new equipment.10 7
98. See 42 U.S.C. § 7477 (2004) (discussing remedial measures EPA may take
with non-complying entities).
99. See Halfpenny, supra note 7 (discussing history of Red Dog case).
100. See id. (noting mine's proposal to use more "Low NO." related
technology).
101. See id. (describing Low NO.).
102. See id. (saying ADEC found alternative process to "Low NO." it believed
would be good for Red Dog Mine).
103. See id. (noting that "Low NO." process was less costly). Red Dog Mine
offered to use the "Low NO." process more to meet the ADEC concerns. Id.
104. See Halfpenny, supra note 7 (stating ADEC approved Red Dog's mine
permit application).
105. See id. (discussing EPA reaction to ADEC approval of Red Dog Mine's
plan for emissions control).
106. See id. (discussing how EPA found ADEC to be in non-compliance of
CAA).
107. See id. (noting EPA had put in orders to prevent Red Dog Mine from
going ahead after ADEC approved their permit).
2005] 119
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In response to the EPA's orders, the ADEC petitioned the
Ninth Circuit for review arguing that the EPA had exceeded its au-
thority and that the state had acted within its discretion regarding
the BACT. 108 The Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the EPA, finding
that while the state has discretion to make the BACT determina-
tions, the EPA has the "ultimate authority" to decide whether the
state has complied with the CAA's BACT requirements. 10 9 The
ADEC then appealed the case to the Supreme Court.110
B. The Majority Decision
In Red Dog, the Supreme Court ruled that the CAA authorized
the EPA to issue stop construction orders based on a finding that
the state determinations did not comply with BACT require-
ments.11 x The Court noted that while states are given great leeway
in making determinations about BACT, the EPA may nonetheless
interfere to make sure that the CAA's statutory requirements are
honored. 112 The Court noted that the state is not forbidden from
altering its original BACT decision. 113 Rather, the state is free to
revisit the permit process to meet the EPA's standards.114
C. The Dissent
Justice Kennedy believed that the majority allowed the EPA to
usurp a traditional state role. 115 He felt the majority's reasoning
would allow other federal agencies to claim ultimate decision-mak-
ing authority, relegating the states to the role of "mere prov-
inces." 116 Justice Kennedy further noted, "if cooperative federalism
is to achieve Congress' goal of allowing state governments to be
accountable to the democratic process in implementing environ-
108. See Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. EPA, 298 F.3d
814 (9th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter ADEC] (discussing petition by ADEC to Ninth
Circuit).
109. See id. at 820 (noting EPA has final say with regard to state decisions
regarding BACT).
110. See Red Dog, 124 S. Ct. 983, 987 (2004) (explaining procedural history of
case).
111. See id. at 991 (noting that Congress gave EPA sweeping powers when
making BACT determinations as required to prevent significant deterioration).
112. See id. at 1003 (stating that EPA has limited, but vital role, and EPA's
actions here were consistent with that role).
113. See id. at 990 (noting state is free to revisit permit process).
114. See id. at 1009 (emphasizing ADEC can reconsider BACT).
115. See RedDog, 124 S. Ct. at 1018 (KennedyJ. dissenting) (noting that CAA
relies on federal-state partnership).
116. See id. (KennedyJ. dissenting) (discussing how states will go from being
co-equal sovereigns to puppets of federal government).
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mental policies, federal agencies cannot consign states" to perform-
ing minimal tasks, while reserving the real power for themselves)11 7
IV. IMPACT
While cooperative federalism is far from dead, Red Dog appears
to be contrary to the Supreme Court's recent federalism jurispru-
dence in that it allows a federal agency to intrude on what is gener-
ally seen as a state function. Cooperative federalism, however,
remains the ideal, as it already has the blessing of the Supreme
Court, while more coercive measures have been struck down. 118 As
illustrated in Red Dog, a state still has great leeway to determine its
environmental policies, but it appears that the EPA will have the
ultimate authority to accept or reject a state's environmental
policies.119
A. Pre-Red Dog Circuit Decisions
Before Red Dog, several circuits had in fact limited the EPA's
ability to overturn state decisions, saying that the CAA's version of
cooperative federalism granted the states more authority, rather
than less as the Supreme Court later suggested.' 20 While Red Dog
only dealt indirectly with some of the issues brought forth in these
cases, the decision appears to challenge the prior circuit holdings
granting the states more power under the CAA. 121
1. The D. C. Circuit
In American Corn Growers v. EPA (American Corn),122 the D.C.
Circuit held that the EPA exceeded its authority under the CAA by
requiring states to engage in regional, rather than source-by-source,
analysis when making Best Available Retrofit Technology (BART)
determinations concerning air pollution. 123 In their per curiam de-
cision, the judges held that the EPA regulation "impermissibly re-
117. See id. (Kennedy, J. dissenting) (stating that this decision could lead to
federal agencies usurping authority best left to states).
118. See Adler, supra note 5, at 617 (explaining cooperative federalism with
relation to CAA).
119. See Red Dog, 124 S. Ct. at 990 (discussing EPA role after state decisions
have been made).
120. See id. at 990-1009 (noting holding of case).
121. See id. (holding state in this case had to submit to EPA authority in deci-
sion making).
122. See American Corn Growers v. EPA, 291 F.3d 1, 6-7 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
[hereinafter American Corn] (holding EPA violated CAA in putting certain require-
ments on state).
123. See id. at 4-8 (discussing D.C. Circuit Court decision).
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strained state authority" in an area where Congress intended the
states to have discretion. 124 Further, the D.C. Circuit held that the
CAA, in this area, intended the states to have more authority that
was allowed by the EPA regulation. 125
2. The Fifth Circuit
In Florida Power & Light Co. v. Costle (Florida Light),126 the Fifth
Circuit held that the EPA had abused its discretion in trying to
force Florida to accept its revisions to its state implementation plan
(SIP) for sulfur emissions. 12 7 The Fifth Circuit noted that the CAA
left numerous responsibilities to the states while restricting the
EPA's authority. 128
In addition, the Fifth Circuit held that Congress intended the
CAA to strike a "balance" between federal and state governments,
with both working together to achieve their goals. 129 Further, it was
noted that the EPA had no discretion in its view of what Florida
state law required, especially when the state of Florida claimed a
different interpretation. 30 Also, the EPA plays a "circumscribed"
role under the CAA, and in this case the state should be given
deference. 3 1
3. The Seventh Circuit
In Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Gorsuch (Bethlehem Steel),132 the Sev-
enth Circuit held that the EPA could not change Indiana's SIP pro-
124. See id. at 8-9 (holding states have discretion when it comes to BART
determinations).
125. See id. at 7 (noting finding that CAA gave states general grant of author-
ity in relation to BART).
126. See Florida Light & Power v. Costle, 650 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1981) [herein-
after Florida Light] (holding that EPA abused its discretion in finding that it could
assume control of state implementation plan once it had already been approved).
127. See id. at 587-88 (holding that EPA was wrong to try and require state to
change its already approved SIP plan).
128. See id. at 588 (observing that Congressional intent most likely did not
include idea that EPA could gain control of SIP plans after EPA had already ap-
proved them).
129. See id. at 581 (discussing purpose of CAA and role states and federal
government were to play).
130. See id. at 588 (holding EPA has no discretion in its interpretation of state
law, and that EPA cannot point to any sources to back up its interpretation).
131. See Florida Light, 650 F.2d at 579-81 (describing EPA's role in CAA).
132. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Gorsuch, 742 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1984)
[hereinafter Bethlehem Steel] (holding EPA could not require more stringent plan
for state without following proper CAA procedures).
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gram under the guise of partial approval.1 33 The Seventh Circuit
found that while the EPA had the power to accept parts or all of a
state's SIP, it could not alter the SIP to require a state to accept
stricter pollution standards. 13 4 Further, the Seventh Circuit held
the EPA's actions were in danger of violating the federal-state rela-
tionship Congress created in the CAA. 135
The Seventh Circuit found that the CAA gave the states broad
discretion to create SIPs that met national standards, and EPA
could not change the SIP programs without going through all the
proper administrative procedures.1 36 Under the CAA, the EPA
does have the authority to change state plans, such as SIPs, if it can
show the state is attempting to weaken its current environmental
standards. 137
B. Public Policy Arguments
How the Red Dog decision will eventually affect future policy is
unknown, but as has been noted previously, the states still need the
federal government and the federal government still needs the
states.' 38 In fact, commentators have made strong arguments for
increasing the state role in environmental policy while still allowing
the federal government to play its role as well. 13 9
1. Spillovers
The possibility of spillovers, or cross-boundary pollution, has
been an argument made for keeping a national environmental pol-
icy. 140 While having a national policy might serve well for large
Superfund-style pollution sites, most spillovers are small and tend to
require a local response.141 Cooperative federalism allows for this,
133. See id. at 1028-29 (noting EPA cannot partially approve state plan to put
in stricter EPA standards).
134. See id. at 1034-35 (stating EPA could not require state to adopt stricter
standard than in its current SIP plan).
135. See id. at 1036-37 (discussing federal-state relationship created under
CAA).
136. See id. (noting EPA cannot alter state SIP programs without going
through proper administrative procedures).
137. See id. at 1037 (stating EPA has power to alter state plans, but only under
appropriate circumstances). The situation presented in this case had the EPA
abusing its power by changing Indiana's SIP. Id.
138. See Dwyer, supra note 1, at 1190 (discussing relationship between federal
and state government).
139. See id. (summarizing reasons why federalist doctrine shows promise).
140. See Adler, supra note 5 at 627-28 (defining and discussing spillovers).
141. See id. at 627 (discussing spillovers and need for local, not national
response).
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in that it gives the states more say over localized matters as opposed
to letting a large national bureaucracy dictate policy for regions
where it might not fully understand the local situation.142
2. The Need for State Input on the Federal Level
Another argument that has been made is that it is both imprac-
tical and unnecessary for the federal government to set environ-
mental policy without state input.' 43 The federal government no
longer has the ability to direct environmental policy without seek-
ing help from the state and local level.1 44 The converse is true as
well. 145 State and local officials are often directed by local political
and economic interests and could not possibly be expected to take
on local environmental concerns without federal intervention. 146
In addition to this, because many environmental problems are
local in nature, local knowledge is needed. 147 A federal policy of
"one-size-fits-all could easily become one-size-fits-nobody," leaving
the states to be governed by a non-responsive federal policy.
148
3. The People
America has changed since the CAA was passed. 149 While sup-
port for environmental protection remains high, the definition of
what it means to be an environmentalist has been in a state of
flux.1 50 No longer does support for the environment mean support
142. See id. at 628 (discussing benefits of having more state control over small-
er environmental issues).
143. See id. at 628-30 (noting states are now much better prepared to deal with
environmental problems than in past years).
144. See Percival, supra note 27, at 1178-79 (stating federal government cannot
function in environmental arena without state and local help).
145. See id. at 1179 (stating local politicians come under pressures that are
best handled at national level).
146. See id. at 1179-80 (finding that politics often plays large role when it comes
to environmental issues).
147. See Adler, supra note 5, at 629 (relaying practical nature of local control
over local matters).
148. See id. (discussing how local communities end up suffering under nation-
alized environmental policies).
149. See id. at 632 (noting while strong environmental policy remains priority
for Americans, things are changing). It is noted that while people support envi-
ronmental protection, it does not necessarily mean they support the current gov-
ernment model. Id.
150. See id. (discussing evolving definition of environmentalist). An environ-
mentalist can be someone who wishes to conserve the environment, someone who
wishes to preserve the environment or a host of other definitions. See id.
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for government policy.15 1 When voters were given a choice on who
they best think should direct environmental policy, nearly two-
thirds of those surveyed felt that the local government would do a
better job than the federal one. 152 However, merely giving states
greater responsibility over environmental matters will not ensure a
better performance than the federal government. 15 3 Historically
speaking, this may have the opposite effect.' 5 4 So to try and satisfy
both state and federal officials, cooperative federalism seems to be
the best answer.
C. Red Dog's Effect on the CAA
After Printz, scholars thought the CAA would be gutted under
the Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence, but instead Red Dog
has strengthened the CAA.155 Instead of invalidating the EPA's
power to block a state's decision with regard to BACT, the Court
upheld the EPA action. 156 Further, the Court maintained that
while states have the initial responsibility to determine BACT, the
EPA maintained the supervisory authority to overturn arbitrary
state decisions.' 5 7
Through Red Dog, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the EPA's
authority under the CAA, but the Court also emphasized the state's
important role in shaping environmental policy. 158 While Red Dog
may seem to shift the power over environmental policy to the fed-
eral government, it in fact emphasizes the CAA's main purpose,
which is for the states and federal government to work together to
craft a manageable environmental policy.159
151. See id. (noting support for environment does not necessarily translate
into support for government policies). The states on their own have been making
breakthroughs in environmental regulation. See id.
152. See Adler, supra note 5 at 632 (citations omitted) (discussing results of
Polling Co., National Survey of Attitudes on Environmental Policy).
153. See Dwyer, supra note 1, at 1180 (noting state oversight of environmental
policy does not necessarily mean things will change positively).
154. See id. (stating states do not always end up promoting environmental pol-
icy in beneficial ways).
155. See Halfpenny, supra note 7 (observing Ninth Circuit decision in Red Dog
was likely to be overturned). Halfpenny believed that given the Ninth Circuit's
high reversal rate and precedent indicating otherwise, the Supreme Court would
surely overturn the Ninth Circuit. Id.
156. See Red Dog, 124 S. Ct. 983 (2004) (holding EPA had power under CAA to
overrule state agency determinations).
157. See id. at 988 (holding EPA has authority to act in cases where state au-
thority's have arbitrarily determined BACT).
158. See id. at 986-90 (discussing state and federal role in CAA).
159. See id. at 992 (noting how state must submit implementation plan to EPA
for approval).
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V. CONCLUSION
In the 1970s, the federal government initially took more con-
trol over environmental policy, but currently the states are taking a
more expansive role in shaping policy.160 Because the states have
taken a greater role in environmental policy, the federal and state
governments must cooperate to create and implement environmen-
tal policies. 161 This is because cooperation is beneficial to both
parties.' 62
Cooperative federalism allows both the state and federal gov-
ernments to have a voice in environmental policy.' 63 Congress may
assist the states in creating environmental programs the federal gov-
ernment could not handle on its own because of the uniqueness of
each state's terrain. 164 In addition, the most politically sensitive en-
vironmental programs generally occur at the state level, and federal
regulators who ignore state political and economic concerns do so
at the risk of losing support of their constituents and the state
governments.165
While it appears that Red Dog has shifted the balance of power
in environmental policy to the federal government, it would be a
mistake to assume cooperative federalism has outlived its useful-
ness. 166 Red Dog reasserted the valuable role states play in determin-
ing environmental policy.' 67 Red Dog made it clear that if the CAA
is to obtain its full benefit, the states and federal government must
cooperate.' 68 While Red Dog limited state authority in favor of
160. See Dwyer, supra note 1, at 1216-19 (discussing inevitability of more state
autonomy in environmental protection).
161. See id. (noting various reasons why state and federal governments should
work together on environmental policy).
162. See id. (stating reasons why cooperation is beneficial to state and federal
governments).
163. See Percival, supra note 30 at 1144 (observing that Congress often allows
states to set their own policies on environmental issues but allows for federal
oversight).
164. See Dwyer, supra note 1, at 1218 (noting how diverse state environments
are, and difficulty of federal government trying to set national policy without state
assistance).
165. See id. (stating that when federal regulators run roughshod over state
concerns they lose local support and find their environmental projects much more
difficult to put into effect).
166. See Red Dog, 124 S. Ct. 983 (2004) (holding EPA had authority to override
state decision concerning BACT).
167. See id. (noting role state plays under CAA). The state has the initial re-
sponsibility in deciding whether an entity has complied with the BACT rules. Id.
168. See id. (discussing CAA role in giving responsibilities to state and federal
government).
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greater federal authority, it reaffirmed the need for cooperation be-
tween the state and federal government. 169
Scott Josephson
169. See id. (discussing state and federal role in implementing BACT rules).
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